system contains several features and configurations that provide you the ability to create a configuration that contributes to the security of your network. In particular, the BIG-IP system is in a unique position to mitigate some types of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that try to consume system resources in order to deny service to the intended recipients.
| || |Hardened and dedicated kernel
The BIG-IP kernel has a mechanism built in to protect against SYN Flood attacks by limiting simultaneous connections, and tearing down connections that have unacknowledged SYN/ACK packets after some time period as passed. (A SYN/ACK
packet is a packet that is sent as part of the TCP three-way handshake).
| || |High performance
BIG-IP system can handle tens of thousands of Layer 4 (L4) connections per second. It would take a very determined attack to affect either the BIG-IP system itself, or the site, if sufficient server resources and bandwidth are available.
| || |Large amount of available memory
SYN floods, or denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, can consume all available memory. The BIG-IP system supports a large amount of memory to help it resist DoS attacks.
For more information about these tasks, click the Help tab in the
Configuration utility, or see the Configuration Guide for BIG-IP® Local Traffic Management
The BIG-IP system contains two global settings that provide the ability to
reap connections adaptively. Connection reaping
is when connections are removed from the BIG-IP system when the connection load uses enough memory to trigger the start of aggressive reaping. To prevent denial-of-service attacks, you can specify a low-water mark threshold and a high-water mark threshold:
| || |The low-water mark
threshold determines at what point adaptive reaping becomes more aggressive.
| || |The high-water mark
threshold determines when unestablished connections through the BIG-IP system will no longer be allowed. The value of this variable represents a percentage of memory utilization.
Once memory utilization has reached the high-water mark, connections are
disallowed until the available memory has been reduced to the low-water mark threshold.
Set the Reaper High-water Mark
property to 95
Set the Reaper Low-water Mark
property to 85
When you set this logging level, the system logs a rate-limited message
(maximum once every 10 seconds), informing you that the adaptive reaping mode has been entered or exited. This log message has a priority of warning. For more information about the log level, refer to the db man page.
The following levels do not display the Blocking DoS Attack
message on the LCD.
You can set the TCP and UDP timers in the profile settings for the TCP
profile and the UDP profiles. You should set these timers for the services that you use for your virtual servers. For example, 60
for HTTP connections, 60
for SSL connections.
The next task in setting up a simple configuration for DoS is to create a rate
class. You must first create a rate class, and then apply the rate class to a virtual server.
| |Click the Create
button to create a new rate class.
The New Rate Class screen opens.
: If the Create
button is unavailable, this indicates that your user role does not grant you permission to create a rate class.
In the Class Name
box, type the name you want to use for this class.
In the Base Rate
box, type 2000000
In the Ceiling Rate
box, type 20000000
In the Burst Size
box, type 500
, and select Megabytes
from the list.
From the Queue Discipline
list, select Stochastic Fair Queue
| |From the Rate Class
list, select the rate class you created.
This section describes how to set the connection limits on the main virtual
server. The connection limits determine the maximum number of concurrent connections allowed on a virtual server. In this context, the main virtual server is the virtual server that receives the most traffic to your site.
| |In the Connection Limit
box, type the number you calculated for the connection limit.
You can create BIG-IP rules to filter out malicious DoS attacks. Once you
identify a particular attack, you can write an iRule that discards packets that contain the elements that identify the packet as malicious.
The BIG-IP system is able to filter out the Code Red attack by using an
iRule to send the HTTP request to a dummy pool. For example, Figure 21.1
illustrates an iRule that discards Code Red attacks.
The Nimda worm is designed to attack systems and applications based on
operating system. For Nimda, an iRule can be written as shown in Figure 21.2
You might want to know how the BIG-IP system reacts to certain common
attacks that are designed to deny service by breaking the service or the network devices.
A SYN flood
is an attack against a system for the purpose of exhausting that systems resources. An attacker launching a SYN flood against a target system attempts to occupy all available resources used to establish TCP connections by sending multiple SYN segments containing incorrect IP addresses. Note that the term SYN
refers to a type of connection state that occurs during establishment of a TCP/IP connection.
More specifically, a SYN flood is designed to fill up a SYN queue. A SYN queue
is a set of connections stored in the connection table in the SYN-RECEIVED state, as part of the standard three-way TCP handshake. A SYN queue can hold a specified maximum number of connections in the SYN-RECEIVED state.
Connections in the SYN-RECEIVED state are considered to be half-open
and waiting for an acknowledgement from the client. When a SYN flood causes the maximum number of allowed connections in the SYN-RECEIVED state to be reached, the SYN queue is said to be full, thus preventing the target system from establishing other legitimate connections. A full SYN queue therefore results in partially-open TCP connections to IP addresses that either do not exist or are unreachable. In these cases, the connections must reach their timeout before the server can continue fulfilling other requests.
The BIG-IP system includes a feature designed to alleviate SYN flooding.
Known as SYN Check
, this feature sends information about the flow, in the form of cookies, to the requesting client, so that the system does not need to keep the SYN-RECEIVED state that is normally stored in the connection table for the initiated session. Because the SYN-RECEIVED state is not kept for a connection, the SYN queue cannot be exhausted, and normal TCP communication can continue.
The SYN Check feature complements the existing adaptive reaper feature in
the BIG-IP system. While the adaptive reaper handles established connection flooding, SYN Check prevents connection flooding altogether. That is, while the adaptive reaper must work overtime to flush connections, the SYN Check feature prevents the SYN queue from becoming full, thus allowing the target system to continue to establish TCP connections.
| |In the SYN CheckTM Activation Threshold
box, type the number of connections that you want to define for the threshold.
The ICMP flood
, sometimes referred to as a Smurf attack, is an attack based on a method of making a remote network send ICMP Echo replies to a single host. In this attack, a single packet from the attacker goes to an unprotected networks broadcast address. Typically, this causes every machine on that network to answer with a packet sent to the target.
On the network inside the BIG-IP system, the BIG-IP system ignores
directed subnet broadcasts, and does not respond to the broadcast ICMP Echo that a Smurf attacker uses to initiate an attack.
The UDP flood
attack is most commonly a distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS), where multiple remote systems are sending a large flood of UDP packets to the target.
The BIG-IP system handles these attacks similarly to the way it handles a
SYN flood. If the port is not listening, the BIG-IP system drops the packets. If the port is listening, the reaper removes the false connections.
Setting the UDP idle session timeout to between 5 and 10 seconds reaps
these connections quickly without impacting users with slow connections. However, with UDP this may still leave too many open connections, and your situation may require a setting of between 2 and 5 seconds.
The UDP fragment
attack is based on forcing the system to reassemble huge amounts of UDP data sent as fragmented packets. The goal of this attack is to consume system resources to the point where the system fails.
The BIG-IP system does not reassemble these packets, it sends them on to
the server if they are for an open UDP service. If these packets are sent with the initial packet opening the connection correctly, then the connection is sent to the back-end server. If the initial packet is not the first packet of the stream, the entire stream is dropped.
The Ping of Death
attack is an attack with ICMP echo packets that are larger than 65535 bytes. Since this is the maximum allowed ICMP packet size, this can crash systems that attempt to reassemble the packet.
The BIG-IP system is hardened against this type of attack. However, if the
attack is against a virtual server with the Any IP
feature enabled, then these packets are sent on to the server. It is important that you apply the latest update patches to your servers.
attack is a SYN packet sent with the source address and port the same as the destination address and port.
The BIG-IP system is hardened to resist this attack. The BIG-IP system
connection table matches existing connections so that a spoof of this sort is not passed on to the servers. Connections to the BIG-IP system are checked and dropped if spoofed in this manner.
attack is carried out by a program that sends IP fragments to a machine connected to the Internet or a network. The Teardrop attack exploits an overlapping IP fragment problem present in some common operating systems. The problem causes the TCP/IP fragmentation re-assembly code to improperly handle overlapping IP fragments.
The BIG-IP system can also offer protection from data attacks to the servers
behind the BIG-IP system. The BIG-IP system acts as a port-deny device, preventing many common exploits by simply not passing the attack through to the server.
attack exploits the way certain common operating systems handle data sent to the NetBIOS ports. NetBIOS ports are 135
, using TCP or UDP. The BIG-IP system denies these ports by default.
The Sub 7
attack is a Trojan horse that is designed to run on certain common operating systems. This Trojan horse allows the system to be controlled remotely.
This Trojan horse listens on port 27374
by default. The BIG-IP system does not allow connections to this port from the outside, so a compromised server cannot be controlled remotely.
Do not open high ports (ports above 1024
) without explicit knowledge of what applications will be running on these ports.
is a Trojan horse that is designed to run on certain common operating systems. This Trojan horse allows the system to be controlled remotely.
This Trojan horse listens on UDP port 31337
by default. The BIG-IP system does not allow connections to this port from the outside, so a compromised server cannot be controlled remotely. Do not open high ports (ports above 1024
) without explicit knowledge of what will be running on these ports.